Hardening Arch Linux (HAL)
 | UNDER CONSTRUCTION: The document is currently being modified! |
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Introduction
IntroductionThis is geared at providing a checklists one can walk through after setting up a new Arch Linux installation that has an open connection to the internet. Whether it is a server or just a machine at home that you have ports open on; some if not all of this information might be useful to you.
 | WARNING: While I have administered BSD and Linux machines for many years now, I am not a security expert! |
Legacy Services
If at all possible disable all legacy services, there are just too many vulnerabilities in these services. They include but are not limited to: NIS, RSH client/server, talk client/server, telnet, TFTP, XINETD, CHARGEN, Daytime, echo, discard and time.
There are also a few non-legacy services it is recommended to stay away from: X Window system, Avahi Print Server, DHCP server, LDAP, NFS/RPC, DNS server, FTP server, Samba and SNMP.
While some of these services might be required such as DNS, it is highly recommended if at all possible to run these on a private secluded machine all by itself or inside some sort of container. This way if that host were to get compromised there would not be any sensitive data aside from the DNS records which are already publicly accessible. Realistically one should containerize all daemons that are publicly accessible.
Service Containerization
If you would like to isolate services (DNS, WWW, SQL, etc.) by installing them inside of separate virtual machines, see the article on KVM.
See also: KVM on Arch Linux Root Restrictions
The root user, or super-user account, is the command-line God. It is all powerful and has no allegiances but has the one downfall of doing whatever it is told. To this end it does precisely what it is told, even if that might spell it's own doom and destruction.
 | Not actually meant in a religious way, more as a scare tactic in to taking it seriously. |
Before continuing verify that your user account, not root, has proper access to sudo (non-restricted with password prompt).
If not, one can simple install sudo. First su to root or login as root via KVM.
| # pikaur -S sudo |
And then set the privileges correctly.
| # visudo |
| %wheel ALL=(ALL) ALL |
For the final house-keeping, add a group for shm and make sure the user is apart of the wheel and shm groups.
| # groupadd shm |
| # gpasswd -a username wheel |
| # gpasswd -a username wheel |
Provided everything works, log back into the regular user account to begin restricting the root account.
Editor
EditorHard-code the EDITOR shell variable for the root account.
Putting this in bashrc versus bash_profile makes sure it is used with non-interactive shells in addition to login shells. In addition add a default editor for sudo.
| # echo -e "EDITOR=/usr/bin/rvim\nSUDO_EDITOR=/usr/bin/rvim" | sudo tee --append /root/.bashrc |
| If the root account already has a bashrc file setup, make sure it does not already include an EDITOR setting. |
Then hard-code the editor used for visudo to prevent users from launching it with a prefix EDITOR=editor visudo.
| # sudo visudo |
Add the following line near the top.
| Defaults editor=/usr/bin/rvim |
ArchWiki: "Running a text editor as root can be a security vulnerability as many editors can run arbitrary shell commands or affect files other than the one you intend to edit."
From now on since it is now setup, use sudoedit in order to edit files as the root account instead of using sudo vim file.
This actually has a two-fold response. First it is added security as the file is edited as a copy in user-space and then copied back over the original with sudo once the editor is closed. Second, because the editor then runs in user-space it will use all of the current logged in users settings and themes for said editor along with using their specified editor of choice.
Wheel only Superuser
In order to restrict access to the su command to only the wheel group, edit both /etc/pam.d/su and /etc/pam.d/su-l and uncomment the following.
| # Uncomment the following line to require a user to be in the "wheel" group. auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid |
Cron
If cron is going to be used, it is a good idea to set it up properly.
First install cron.
| # pikaur -S cronie |
Restricting access to cron is as simple as creating a /etc/cron.allow and inserting only the names of users you want to allow access to cron. Every other user on the system will be denied cron access.
| # sudoedit /etc/cron.allow |
| root kyau |
Enable and start the cronie service.
| # sudo systemctl enable cronie # sudo systemctl start cronie |
Finally set proper permissions to all cron files.
| # sudo chmod -R go-rwx /etc/cron* /etc/anacrontab |
File Permissions
The default file permissions, umask 0022, are not setup for security. The NSA themselves recommend a umask of 0077 for maximum security, which makes new files not readable by users other than the owner.
| # sudoedit /etc/profile |
Find the line that marks umask 022 and change it to:
| umask 077 |
Then make sure the user directory is already setup with the proper permissions, we can also add the boot directory and the firewall configs if present.
| # sudo chmod -R go-rwx /root /home/kyau /boot |
Mount Points
tmpfs
Despite the very secure defaults that Arch uses there is still one more thing we can do to tmpfs. Arch already sets nodev to block the creation of special devices that could potential have direct world-writable access to hardware and nosuid to prevent setuid binaries and root escalation issues. However, adding noexec to prevent all execution will help prevent basic script attacks as well. Finally adding a binding mount for /var/tmp simplifies the security.
Add the following lines into the fstab for the /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm mount points.
| tmpfs /tmp tmpfs rw,noatime,nodev,nosuid,mode=1777 0 0 tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs rw,nodev,nosuid,noexec,size=1024M,mode=1770,uid=root,gid=shm 0 0 /tmp /var/tmp none rw,noatime,nodev,noexec,nosuid,bind 0 0 |
Hide Processes
Hiding all other users' processes can make it very difficult for an attacker to assess a system. Adding a line for proc in the fstab file with the right options can limit all users' ability to view processes aside from their own. An exception can also be made for users belonging to the wheel group.
| proc /proc proc nosuid,nodev,noexec,hidepid=2,gid=wheel 0 0 |
Sysctl
Being honest, Arch Linux comes fairly secure out of the box. Things like source routed packets, packet forwarding, multicast packet forwarding and ICMP redirection all default to disabled. Alas, improvements can still be made.
Sysctl can be used to change kernel parameters at runtime by adding to the file /etc/sysctl.d/50-security.conf. There are several improvements that can be made here security wise. Not all of these will be optimal in every use case scenario, but none of them will have harmful effects on your system unless you are running it as a router.
Secure ICMP Routing Redirects
If the source gateway is compromised then an user can update the routing table using Secure ICMP redirects. This can potentially lead to remote packet capture.
This can be disabled.
| net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=0 net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=0 |
Send Redirects
An unauthorized user can use a compromised host to send ICMP redirects packets to another routing device to corrupt its routing. This functionality can be disabled.
| net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0 net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0 |
TCP SYN
An attacker can start a DDoS attack at the server by flooding it with SYN packets without initializing three way handshake. Setting this will helps protect against SYN flood attacks, however it only kicks in when net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog is reached.
| net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 |
TCP Time-wait
To protect against TCP time-wait assassination hazards drop all RST packets for sockets in the time-wait state (not widely supported outside of Linux, but conforms to RFC).
| net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337=1 |
Restrict Kernel Log Access
Kernel logs can contain sensitive system information that you might not want everyone on your system to have access to. This will restrict access to only the root account.
| kernel.dmesg_restrict=1 |
Restrict Kernel Pointers Access
Allowing all users to view kernel pointer addresses can make it easier for kernel exploits to occur. Again restrict this to only the root account.
| kernel.kptr_restrict=1 |
OpenSSH
Hardening SSH is a requirement on any machine connected to the internet with SSH running. It is one of the most common services on the internet and also one of the most common ports attackers go for. The default openssh config is subpar at best, a lot can be done to fix it up. All of the following changes are done in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file.
Listening Port
One of the easiest ways to improve security with SSH is to change the port it listens on. Sometimes this is not an option (if a large number of individuals require access to the server for example), but if you can this option is highly recommended. If possible, choose a port greater than 1024.
| Port 2222 |
Key Exchange
The key exchange ensures that the server and the client shares a secret no one else knows. OpenSSH supports 8 key exchange protocols, the two chosen here are the only ones left given current security risks.[4]
| KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 |
Regenerate the prime numbers used for SSH.
| # sudo ssh-keygen -G /etc/ssh/moduli.all -b 4096 # sudo ssh-keygen -T /etc/ssh/moduli.safe -f /etc/ssh/moduli.all # sudo mv /etc/ssh/moduli.safe /etc/ssh/moduli # sudo rm /etc/ssh/moduli.all |
| This is going to take a while, feel free to continue while it is running |
Authentication
Authentication makes sure that the secret that the server and the client shared during key exchange is only shared with each other and no one else. For authentication, only protocol 2 should be used, as protocol 1 presents security risks. A large RSA key and an Ed25519 key are recommended for authentication.
| Protocol 2 HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key |
This also requires the host keys to be regenerated.
| # cd /etc/ssh # sudo rm ssh_host_*key* # sudo ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" < /dev/null # sudo ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 -f ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" < /dev/null |
| WARNING: After doing this, upon connecting to SSH it will prompt you to accept a new fingerprint. If access is denied due to this, then delete the fingerprint manually from ~/.ssh/known_hosts |
Client authentication via password is susceptible to brute force attacks and should be disabled the moment you have public keys applied and activated in the config. Using public keys instead of password auth means the login grace time can also be effectively disabled.
| PasswordAuthentication no ChallengeResponseAuthentication no PubkeyAuthentication yes LoginGraceTime 20 |
| Setting LoginGraceTime to a lower value such as 1 is recommended if you are using an ssh key agent. |
Public keys can be generated with the following commands.
| # ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -o -a 100 # ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 -o -a 100 |
These keys can be deployed to remote machines with ssh-copy-id.
Despite public keys being very secure, SSH access should also be limited. For this we can create a group specific to allow users SSH access.
| AllowGroups ssh |
Don't forget to create the group and add your user.
| # sudo groupadd ssh # sudo gpasswd -a kyau ssh |
Symmetric Ciphers
The symmetric ciphers are used to encrypt data that goes across the connection after key exchange and authentication have taken place. Taking into account security of the cipher algorithm, key size, block size and cipher mode the following ciphers are recommended.
| Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr |
Message Authentication Codes
"Encryption provides confidentiality, message authentication code provides integrity. We need both."[4] Taking into account security of the hash algorithm, encrypt-then-mac, tag size and key size the following MACs are recommended.
| MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,umac-128@openssh.com |
OpenSSH Client Config
Replicating these changes in the global user config is also a good idea, that way your connections are the same on all your machines and you will not be locked out due to conflicting algorithms.
| # OpenSSH Client Config Host * KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 # comment this if you need password authentication PasswordAuthentication no ChallengeResponseAuthentication no PubkeyAuthentication yes UseRoaming no HostKeyAlgorithms ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,umac-128@openssh.com |
Copy over your newly created SSH keys.
| # ssh-copy-id -oUserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no -i id_ed25519 kyau@neutron.kyau.net |
Keep an active connection to SSH, in-case something goes wrong, and restart the daemon.
| # sudo systemctl restart sshd |
SSH should now be setup properly with it prompting for the SSH key password on login with 20 seconds to enter the password or login fails.
| If issues arise, stop the service and run the daemon manually with debugging enabled sudo /usr/sbin/sshd -ddd |
CPU
Typically for servers the CPU should function in performance mode with a low perf bias. This will allow the CPU to respond as fast as possible and give full power when necessary.
Install cpupower to manage this.
| # pacaur -S cpupower |
Edit the default configuration.
| governor='performance' perf_bias=0 |
Then enable and start the service.
| # sudo systemctl enable cpupower # sudo systemctl start cpupower |
Changes should then be verified.
| # sudo cpupower frequency-info # sudo cpupower info |
Firewall
Some believe nftables will eventually replace iptables as the defacto standard, while this is unclear at this time it is not a bad alternative.[1]
| # pacaur -S nftables |
Then create a basic firewall allowing only SSH and Web traffic, limiting SSH and echo requests to protect against flooding.
| #!/usr/bin/nft -f # ipv4/ipv6 Simple & Safe Firewall # you can find examples in /usr/share/nftables/ table inet filter { chain input { type filter hook input priority 0; # allow established/related connections ct state {established, related} accept # early drop of invalid connections ct state invalid drop # allow from loopback iifname lo accept # no ping floods ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type echo-request limit rate 10/second accept ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 10/second accept # allow ssh, but with brute force protection tcp dport ssh limit rate 15/minute accept # allow http and https traffic tcp dport {http,https} accept # everything else (blackhole) reject with icmp type port-unreachable } # all forwarding traffic gets dropped (we are not a router) chain forward { type filter hook forward priority 0; drop } # let all traffic outbound through the firewall chain output { type filter hook output priority 0; accept } } |
Then enable and start the service.
| # sudo systemctl enable nftables # sudo systemctl start nftables |
To verify all the rules were applied pull up a list of the current ruleset.
| # sudo nft list ruleset |
References
References- "ArchWiki". Cron. https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/cron
- "ArchWiki". Security. https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Security
- "LinOxide". An Ultimate Guide to Secure Ubuntu Host. https://linoxide.com/ubuntu-how-to/ultimate-guide-secure-ubuntu/
- "stribika". Secure Secure Shell. https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html
